Are we seriously realizing our risk at home if we pull our troops out of Iraq in the midst of a civil war? I have read about the record numbers of American troops killed in Iraq this month. How can this number not be disturbing? The fighting that is going on there is painful to hear, painful to read about. The common belief among the public is that we should pull out of Iraq now, and this was a disasterous mistake. What are we doing there, are we just costing us more tax dollars and having more of our military people dying? With all this criticism and resentment building, President Bush still takes the heat with the Democrats striking hard, and even some Republicans joining in, but he holds the line in staying the course with stabilizing Iraq. He vetoes Iraq Withdrawal Legislation, with congress putting up a strong fight demanding troop removal. A friend sent me an article today, knowing my stance and interest in American troops being in Iraq today. We the public, here at home, are not in Iraq fighting this war. How are we to know how to fight this war or for how long? Sometimes having a little knowledge is dangerous, we think we know better, when we don't. Little do we realize how much we are still speaking out of ignorance. Kudos to Senator Joe Lieberman for sharing with Congress and President Bush what is really going on in Iraq and why we need to be there without a random deadline. Given this is not what the majority of Democrats are preaching right now, you have to give the guy credit for speaking from his conscience and not just by his party line. (On a personal note, I have voiced before and will voice again, I do not vote by party alone).
[Image Removed] Special to The Daily Standard
Senator Joe Lieberman's Senate floor speech on Iraq.
04/26/2007 12:00:00 AM
Senator Joe Lieberman (ID-CT) today addressed the Iraq withdrawal
provision in the supplemental appropriations bill on the floor of the
U.S. Senate.
Below is the full text of Senator Lieberman's speech, as prepared for
delivery:
"Mr. President, the supplemental appropriations bill we are debating
today contains language that would have Congress take control of the
direction of our military strategy in Iraq.
Earlier this week the Senate Majority Leader spoke at the Woodrow
Wilson Center and laid out the case for why he believes we must do
this--why the bill now before this chamber, in his view, offers a
viable alternative strategy for Iraq.
I have great respect for my friend from Nevada. I believe he has
offered this proposal in good faith, and therefore want to take it up
in good faith, and examine its arguments and ideas carefully and in
depth, for this is a very serious discussion for our country.
In his speech Monday, the Majority Leader described the several steps
that this new strategy for Iraq would entail. Its first step, he said,
is to "transition the U.S. mission away from policing a civil war--to
training and equipping Iraqi security forces, protecting U.S. forces,
and conducting targeted counter-terror operations."
I ask my colleagues to take a step back for a moment and consider this
plan.
When we say that U.S. troops shouldn't be "policing a civil war," that
their operations should be restricted to this narrow list of missions,
what does this actually mean?
To begin with, it means that our troops will not be allowed to protect
the Iraqi people from the insurgents and militias who are trying to
terrorize and kill them. Instead of restoring basic security, which
General Petraeus has argued should be the central focus of any
counterinsurgency campaign, it means our soldiers would instead be
ordered, by force of this proposed law, not to stop the sectarian
violence happening all around them--no matter how vicious or horrific
it becomes.
In short, it means telling our troops to deliberately and consciously
turn their backs on ethnic cleansing, to turn their backs on the
slaughter of innocent civilians--men, women, and children singled out
and killed on the basis of their religion alone. It means turning our
backs on the policies that led us to intervene in the civil war in
Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the principles that today lead many of us to
call for intervention in Darfur.
This makes no moral sense at all.
It also makes no strategic or military sense either.
Al Qaeda's own leaders have repeatedly said that one of the ways they
intend to achieve victory in Iraq is to provoke civil war. They are
trying to kill as many people as possible today, precisely in the hope
of igniting sectarian violence, because they know that this is their
best way to collapse Iraq's political center, overthrow Iraq's elected
government, radicalize its population, and create a failed state in the
heart of the Middle East that they can use as a base.
That is why Al Qaeda blew up the Golden Mosque in Samarra last year.
And that is why we are seeing mass casualty suicide bombings by Al
Qaeda in Baghdad now.
I have hated the idea of a deadline at this point all along. I am glad to hear someone with a great mind is able to aptly explain the dangers involved in setting such an arbitrary date at this time.
The sectarian violence that the Majority Leader says he wants to order
American troops to stop policing, in other words, is the very same
sectarian violence that Al Qaeda hopes to ride to victory. The
suggestion that we can draw a bright legislative line between stopping
terrorists in Iraq and stopping civil war in Iraq flies in the face of
this reality.
I do not know how to say it more plainly: it is Al Qaeda that is
trying to cause a full-fledged civil war in Iraq.
The Majority Leader said on Monday that he believes U.S. troops will
still be able to conduct "targeted counter-terror operations" under his
plan. Even if we stop trying to protect civilians in Iraq, in other
words, we can still go after the bad guys.
But again, I ask my colleagues, how would this translate into military
reality on the ground? How would we find these terrorists, who do not
gather on conventional military bases or fight in conventional
formations?
By definition, targeted counterterrorism requires our forces to know
where, when, and against whom to strike--and that in turn requires
accurate, actionable, real-time intelligence.
This is the kind of intelligence that can only come from ordinary
Iraqis, the sea of people among whom the terrorists hide. And that, in
turn, requires interacting with the Iraqi people on a close, personal,
daily basis. It requires winning individual Iraqis to our side, gaining
their trust, convincing them that they can count on us to keep them
safe from the terrorists if they share valuable information about them.
This is no great secret. This is at the heart of the new strategy that
General Petraeus and his troops are carrying out.
And yet, if we pass this legislation, according to the Majority
Leader, U.S. forces will no longer be permitted to patrol Iraq's
neighborhoods or protect Iraqi civilians. They won't, in his words, be
"interjecting themselves between warring factions" or "trying to sort
friend from foe."
Therefore, I ask the supporters of this legislation: How, exactly, are
U.S. forces to gather intelligence about where, when, and against whom
to strike, after you have ordered them walled off from the Iraqi
population? How, exactly, are U.S. forces to carry out targeted
counter-terror operations, after you have ordered them cut off from the
very source of intelligence that drives these operations?
This is precisely why the congressional micromanagement of
life-and-death decisions about how, where, and when our troops can
fight is such a bad idea, especially on a complex and changing
battlefield.
In sum, you can't have it both ways. You can't withdraw combat troops
from Iraq and still fight Al Qaeda there. If you believe there is no
hope of winning in Iraq, or that the costs of victory there are not
worth it, then you should be for complete withdrawal as soon as
possible.
There is another irony here as well.
For most of the past four years, under Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, the
United States did not try to establish basic security in Iraq. Rather
than deploying enough troops necessary to protect the Iraqi people, the
focus of our military has been on training and equipping Iraqi forces,
protecting our own forces, and conducting targeted sweeps and raids--in
other words, the very same missions proposed by the proponents of the
legislation before us.
That strategy failed--and we know why it failed. It failed because we
didn't have enough troops to ensure security, which in turn created an
opening for Al Qaeda and its allies to exploit. They stepped into this
security vacuum and, through horrific violence, created a climate of
fear and insecurity in which political and economic progress became
impossible.
For years, many members of Congress recognized this. We talked about
this. We called for more troops, and a new strategy, and--for that
matter--a new secretary of defense.
And yet, now, just as President Bush has come around--just as he has
recognized the mistakes his administration has made, and the need to
focus on basic security in Iraq, and to install a new secretary of
defense and a new commander in Iraq--now his critics in Congress have
changed their minds and decided that the old, failed strategy wasn't so
bad after all.
What is going on here? What has changed so that the strategy that we
criticized and rejected in 2006 suddenly makes sense in 2007?
The second element in the plan outlined by the Majority Leader on
Monday is "the phased redeployment of our troops no later than October
1, 2007."
Let us be absolutely clear what this means. This legislation would
impose a binding deadline for U.S. troops to begin retreating from
Iraq. This withdrawal would happen regardless of conditions on the
ground, regardless of the recommendations of General Petraeus, in short
regardless of reality on October 1, 2007.
As far as I can tell, none of the supporters of withdrawal have
attempted to explain why October 1 is the magic date--what strategic or
military significance this holds. Why not September 1? Or January 1?
This is a date as arbitrary as it is inflexible--a deadline for defeat.
How do proponents of this deadline defend it? On Monday, Senator Reid
gave several reasons. First, he said, a date for withdrawal puts
"pressure on the Iraqis to make the desperately needed political
compromises."
But will it? According to the legislation now before us, the
withdrawal will happen regardless of what the Iraqi government does.
How, then, if you are an Iraqi government official, does this give you
any incentive to make the right choices?
On the contrary, there is compelling reason to think a legislatively
directed withdrawal of American troops will have exactly the opposite
effect than its Senate sponsors intend.
This, in fact, is exactly what the most recent National Intelligence
Estimate on Iraq predicted. A withdrawal of U.S. troops in the months
ahead, it said, would "almost certainly lead to a significant increase
in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict, intensify Sunni
resistance, and have adverse effects on national reconciliation."
Second, the Majority Leader said that withdrawing our troops, and
again I quote, will "reduce the specter of the U.S. occupation which
gives fuel to the insurgency."
My colleague from Nevada, in other words, is suggesting that the
insurgency is being provoked by the very presence of American troops.
By diminishing that presence, then, he believes the insurgency will
diminish.
But I ask my colleagues--where is the evidence to support this theory?
Since 2003, and before General Petraeus took command, U.S. forces were
ordered on several occasions to pull back from Iraqi cities and
regions, including Mosul and Fallujah and Tel'Afar and Baghdad. And
what happened in these places? Did they stabilize when American troops
left? Did the insurgency go away?
On the contrary--in each of these places where U.S. forces pulled
back, Al Qaeda rushed in. Rather than becoming islands of peace, they
became safe havens for terrorists, islands of fear and violence.
So I ask advocates of withdrawal: on what evidence, on what data, have
you concluded that pulling U.S. troops out will weaken the insurgency,
when every single experience we have had since 2003 suggests that this
legislation will strengthen it?
Consider the words of Sheikh Abdul Sattar, one of the leading Sunni
tribal leaders in Anbar province who is now fighting on our side
against Al Qaeda. This is what he told the New York Times when asked
last month what would happen if U.S. troops withdraw. "In my personal
opinion, and in the opinion of most of the wise men of Anbar," he said,
"if the American forces leave right now, there will be civil war and
the area will fall into total chaos."
This is a man whose father was killed by Al Qaeda, who is risking his
life every day to work with us--a man who was described by one Army
officer as "the most effective local leader in Ramadi I believe the
coalition has worked with in Anbar [since] 2003."
In his remarks earlier this week, the Majority Leader observed that
there is "a large and growing population of millions--who sit
precariously on the fence. They will either condemn or contribute to
terrorism in the years ahead. We must convince them of the goodness of
America and Americans. We must win them over."
On this, I completely agree with my friend from Nevada. My question to
him, however, and to the supporters of this legislation, is this: how
does the strategy you propose in this bill possibly help win over this
population of millions in Iraq, who sit precariously on the fence?
What message, I ask, does this legislation announce to those people in
Iraq? How will they respond when we tell them that we will no longer
make any effort to protect them against insurgents and death squads?
How will they respond when we declare that we will be withdrawing our
forces--regardless of whether they make progress in the next six months
towards political reconciliation? Where will their hopes for a better
life be when we withdraw the troops that are the necessary precondition
for the security and stability they yearn for?
Do my friends really believe that this is the way to convince Iraqis,
and the world, of the goodness of America and Americans? Does anyone in
this chamber really believe that, by announcing a date certain for
withdrawal, we will empower Iraqi moderates, or enable Iraq's
reconstruction, or open more schools for their children, or more
hospitals for their families, or freedom for everyone?
Mr. President, with all due respect, this is fantasy.
The third step the Majority Leader proposes is to impose "tangible,
measurable, and achievable benchmarks on the Iraqi government."
I am all for such benchmarks. In fact, Senator McCain and I were among
the first to propose legislation to apply such benchmarks on the Iraqi
government.
But I don't see how this plan will encourage Iraqis to meet these or
any other benchmarks, given its ironclad commitment to abandon
them--regardless of how they behave.
We should of course be making every effort to encourage reconciliation
in Iraq and the development of a decent political order that Sunnis,
Shiites, and Kurds can agree on.
But even if today that political solution was found, we cannot
rationally think that our terrorist enemies like Al Qaeda in Iraq will
simply vanish.
Al Qaeda is not mass murdering civilians on the streets of Baghdad
because it wants a more equitable distribution of oil revenues. Its aim
in Iraq is not to get a seat at the political table.
It wants to blow up the table--along with everyone seated at it. Al
Qaeda wants to destroy any prospect for democracy in Iraq, and it will
not be negotiated or reasoned out of existence. It must be fought and
defeated through force of arms. And there can be no withdrawal, no
redeployment from this reality.
The fourth step that the Majority Leader proposed on Monday is a
"diplomatic, economic, and political offensive starting with a regional
conference working toward a long-term framework for stability in the
region."
I understand why we are tempted by these ideas. All of us are aware of
the justified frustration, fatigue, and disappointment of the American
people. And all of us would like to believe that there is a quick and
easy solution to the challenges we face in Iraq.
But none of this gives us an excuse to paper over hard truths. We
delude ourselves if we think we can wave a legislative wand and
suddenly our troops in the field will be able to distinguish between Al
Qaeda terrorism and sectarian violence, or that Iraqis will suddenly
settle their political differences because our troops are leaving, or
that sweet reason alone will suddenly convince Iran and Syria to stop
destabilizing Iraq.
Mr. President, what we need now is a sober assessment of the progress
we have made and a recognition of the challenges we face. There are
still many uncertainties before us, many complexities. Barely half of
the new troops that General Petraeus has requested have even arrived in
Iraq, and, as we heard from him yesterday, it will still be months
before we will know just how effective his new strategy is.
In following General Petraeus' path, there is no guarantee of
success--but there is hope, and a new plan, for success.
The plan embedded in this legislation, on the other hand, contains no
such hope. It is a strategy of catchphrases and bromides, rather than
military realities in Iraq. It does not learn from the many mistakes we
have made in Iraq. Rather, it promises to repeat them.
Let me be absolutely clear: In my opinion, Iraq is not yet lost--but
if we follow this plan, it will be. And so, I fear, much of our hope
for stability in the Middle East and security from terrorism here at
home.
I yield the floor."
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